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Monetary policy in response to imported price shocks:  
the Israeli case 
Zvi Eckstein
1 and Guy Segal
2 
1 Introduction 
Like any other small open economy, the Israeli economy is exposed to global price shocks, 
which have recently presented greater challenges to the conduct of monetary policy. The 
high volatility of international food and energy prices during the last two years highlights the 
question of whether monetary policy should respond to external price shocks using the same 
rule it uses to respond to domestic price shocks. Israel adopted the headline (CPI) inflation 
target range of 1-3% in 2003. Within a flexible inflation targeting framework, the monetary 
policy responds to both lagged and expected price changes in order to preserve price 
stability while minimising output (gap) volatility and maintaining interest rate stability. Due to 
the fact that an external price shock leads to a trade-off between inflation and output gap, a 
monetary policy that focuses on headline inflation may cause a deeper recession than a 
policy that responds to a measure of inflation that excludes external price shocks that are 
highly flexible - known as core inflation.  
Since about the fourth quarter of 2007, headline inflation in Israel has been distinguished 
from core inflation, defined as the CPI excluding the energy, food, and fruit and vegetables 
components.
3 At that time, and in the first half of 2008, the Bank of Israel faced a dilemma 
regarding the appropriate interest rate policy response to the increase in inflation that was 
mainly due to changes in energy and food prices.  
In this paper we analyse the impact on inflation and the output gap of different interest-rate-
policy responses to external price shocks, using a variant of an estimated New Keynesian 
(NK) model for Israel (Argov and Elkayam (2007)). The model consists of four structural 
equations: a New Keynesian Phillips curve for domestic inflation, derived from firms’ optimal 
price setting following Rotemberg (1982); an output gap equation, derived from optimal 
consumer allocation; a nominal exchange rate (ILS/US$) equation, based on an uncovered 
interest parity (UIP) condition with partial indexation; and an expanded forward-looking 
Taylor rule, by which the central bank (CB) sets the interest rate. 
We compare the predicted outcome of the model relating to a transitory shock to imported 
consumer prices, when the Taylor rule responds to headline (HI) CPI inflation with a Taylor 
rule that responds to our definition of core inflation, following the literature. Specifically, we 
follow Aoki (2001), who defined core inflation as resulting from sticky-price sector 
components of the price index. Assuming that external prices that exhibit high price volatility 
should be viewed as flexible, and assuming immediate pass-through, we define two core 
inflation indices for the Israeli model; I) headline inflation excluding housing, fuel, fruit and 
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vegetables and imported consumer price components. II) The same as I, but including the 
housing price component.
4  
Comparing the response of the economy using the three rules, we find that using the 
headline (CPI) inflation rule gives higher volatility of inflation than do the core inflation rules, 
while the volatilities of the output gap and interest rates are lower. Using an ad hoc quadratic 
welfare-loss function of inflation, consumption gap and interest rate, we find that a Taylor rule 
that responds to core inflation including the housing price component yields higher welfare 
for the representative household.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model and defines core inflation, 
section 3 summarises the literature on the welfare-loss function, section 4 describes inflation 
and commodity prices in Israel in 2007 and 2008, section 5 discusses the results of the 
model, and section 6 concludes. 
2  A New Keynesian (NK) model for Israel 
In this section we describe the model used at the Bank of Israel (Argov and Elkayam (2007)) 
for monetary policy analysis, and we define headline inflation and core inflation. This 
framework will be used later to analyse the main question of this paper. 
2.1.1 The  model 
We use a variant of the small quarterly estimated NK model for Israel used by the Bank of 
Israel (Argov and Elkayam (2007); Argov et al (2007)). The model consists of four structural 
equations (see Appendix A for details): 
a)  An open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived from firms’ 
optimal price setting a la Rotemberg (1982) for domestic inflation, 
h
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 where  t y  is the output gap, 
* zc
t p  is the world price of inputs relative to consumer 
goods expressed in log deviation from trend,
6  t q  is the real exchange rate, defined 
as the price of imported consumer goods, 
*
t p , in local currency (ILS) relative to the 
domestic price, that is 
h
t t t t p e p q   
* , where  t e  is the nominal ILS/US$ exchange 
rate. Domestic inflation, 
h
t  , is defined herein as headline inflation (CPI) excluding 
prices of housing, fuel, fruit and vegetables, and imported consumer goods. Finally, 
h
t
   is a cost-push shock. 
                                                  
4    Housing prices were highly flexible and were linked to the ILS/US$ exchange rate and, therefore, were 
traditionally excluded from the definition of core inflation in Israel. However, within the model we use, housing 
prices are sticky.  
5   The derived Phillips curve should include only the current output gap (see Appendix A). However, a better fit 
was achieved by including a simple average of the current and lagged output gap. 
6   All variables apart from interest rates are expressed in log deviations from trend, which is calculated by HP 
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b)  A dynamic IS curve, the output gap equation,  t y , which is derived from optimal 
consumer allocation (the inter-temporal Euler equation): 
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  where government consumption,  t g , investment,  t inv , world trade, 
*
t y , and 
y
t  , 
which is an error term, are all given exogenous variables,  t i  is the domestic risk-free 
interest rate, and  t   is defined as the weighted sum of domestic inflation, 
h
t  , and 
imported consumer goods inflation in local currency, 
*
t  .  
  Argov and Elkayam (2007) estimated the domestic NKPC under two assumptions: a 
gradual pass-through and an immediate pass-through from the exchange rate and 
imported consumer goods prices to local prices. In this paper we assume an 
immediate pass-through of imported consumer inflation, and, as a result, imported 
consumer price inflation in local currency, 
*
t  , is fully flexible. Thus, 
*
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the dollar, and 
*
t   is an error term. Finally,  h ah   1
1 , where  ) 1 , 0 (  h  represents 
the strength of external habit formation, and 
1    is the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution in the intra-temporal utility function of the representative household j, 
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c)  A nominal ILS/US$ exchange rate equation,  t e , which is derived from an expanded 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition for no-arbitrage between domestic and 
foreign bonds and is given by 
 (3) 
e
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 where 
*
t i  is the foreign risk-free rate,  t   is a risk premium paid on foreign assets, 
and 
e
t   is a nominal exchange rate random shock. 
d)  The central bank (CB) sets interest rates following a forward-looking Taylor rule, 
with interest rate smoothing, given by 
 (4)  1 3 ] ) ( )[ 1 (          t i t y
R
t t t i t i k y k E k r k i     , 
 where  t r  is the forward yield to maturity on indexed-linked Treasury bonds, a proxy 
to the natural rate, and   is the inflation target.  
  We use a Taylor rule which responds to three-period forward inflation, ie 
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monetary policy that aims to anchor inflation expectations.  
  The model is closed with three equations for the housing, fuel, and fruit and 
vegetables price components of the CPI. The CPI housing component equation is a 
function of the nominal rate of ILS/US$ depreciation,  t de , reflecting the indexation of 212  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
housing prices to the dollar (Eckstein and Soffer (2006)), and the long run impact of 
the inflation target,  : 
 (5)  ) )( 1 ( ) ( 1            t t
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  The CPI fuel price equation is given by: 









t       is the price change of a barrel of crude oil, and 
brent
t   is a 
random shock.  
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  Finally, the CPI inflation is calculated from the identity: 
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  This completes the description of the dynamic Bank of Israel model for the analysis 
of monetary policy. We now turn to the definitions of core inflation. 
2.1.2  Core inflation indices 
Within a flexible inflation targeting framework, monetary policy responds to both lagged and 
expected price changes to preserve price stability while minimising output (gap) volatility and 
maintaining interest rate stability. Due to the fact that an external price shock leads to a 
trade-off between inflation and the output gap, a monetary policy that focuses on headline 
inflation may react too aggressively compared with a policy that responds to core inflation. 
Hence, most central banks monitor core inflation as part of the interest rate decision-making 
process, as core inflation reduces transitory noise and could prevent the central bank from 
responding too strongly to transitory shocks (Mishkin (2007)).  
Aoki (2001) shows that in a closed-economy two-sector DSGE model with a flexible-price 
sector and a sticky-price sector, the sticky-price inflation equation is a function of the relative 
price of the flexible-price sector. In that framework, following Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997), Aoki derives a second-order approximation of the expected utility of the 
representative household (a loss function), and shows that it is a function of only the sticky-
price inflation. As a result, he finds that stabilising sticky-price inflation is the optimal 
monetary policy. Hence, optimisation in Aoki’s model is reached by a rule that responds only 
to core inflation.  
Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2008) show that in a DSGE model with a flexible price 
energy production factor, optimal monetary policy responds to core inflation. This core 
inflation is defined as the CPI excluding food and energy prices. 
Following the above and the assumption in our model of immediate pass-through from the 
exchange rate and world prices to the import price in the local market, we define two core 
indices within the framework of the model: 
I. Domestic  inflation, 
h
t  , which is the CPI index excluding prices of housing, fuel, fruit 
and vegetables and imported consumer goods. We denote this core inflation index 
as CI. This price index accounts for about 43% of the CPI. BIS Papers No 49  213
 
 
II.  The weighted sum of CI and the housing price component. We denote this second 
core inflation as CIH.
7 This price index accounts for about 64% of the CPI. 
We compare the impulse response function of inflation, output gap and interest rate to a 
transitory 1% shock to prices of imported goods using three different inflation indices’ Taylor 
rules: 
I.  The year-on year expected CPI (headline inflation rule, HIR). 
II.  The year-on year expected CI (core inflation rule, CIR). 
III.  The year-on year expected CIH (CIHR).  
The above is a simple positive method for analysing the monetary policy response to 
external imported price shocks. To perform a normative analysis, and following the literature, 
we use an ad hoc loss function. In the next section we summarise the loss function literature 
and analyse the implications of the different Taylor rules on the policy loss function.  
3  The loss function 
We assume that the loss function has three terms: the gap between actual core inflation and 
the inflation target, the consumption gap and the change in the policy interest rate. This is a 
loss function that represents the welfare of the representative household.  
Next, we calculate the loss function defined above using the three alternative Taylor rule 
responses to a transitory shock in imported consumer goods. By comparing the ratio of the 
loss function calculated using one Taylor rule to that calculated using an alternative Taylor 
rule, we can conclude which of the two yields higher welfare.  
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) showed that in a closed economy model with price-setting 
framework a la Calvo,
8 the second-order approximation of the expected utility of the 
representative household, the loss function, is a function of inflation and output gap variance. 
The output gap variance stems from the household utility from consumption, which in a 
closed economy model without investments and government is equal to output. The inflation 
variance stems from the price dispersion, which in a staggered price-setting framework 
distorts the optimal allocation across consumer goods. Following Rotemberg and Woodford’s 
analysis, the loss function has been widely used to compare monetary policy reaction 
functions in term of representative household welfare. 
Levine et al (2008) showed that in a closed economy model for the Euro area with price-
setting framework a la Calvo, an external
9 habit formation, investments and government, the 
external habit formation implies a loss function which is a function of the quasi-change in 
consumption gap. As consumption, which enters the utility function, does not equal output, 
the loss function is a function of the consumption gap instead of the output gap. They also 
showed, similar to Woodford (2003), that in the case of indexation of prices to the lagged 
                                                  
7  H stands for the CPI housing component. 
8  Although the Phillips curve in the model we use is derived within Rotemberg and not Calvo price-setting, 
because its basic structure is similar to a Calvo-style NKPC (although not in deep parameters, of course) we 
can proceed and follow Woodford. 
9  External habit formation means that the household utility depends on the difference between the household 
current consumption and the lagged aggregate consumption. Woodford (2003) assumes internal habit 
formation, ie that the household utility depends on the difference between its current and lagged consumption, 
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where   measures the degree of price indexation and h  denotes the level of external habit 
formation in consumption. 
In order to derive the loss function, the utility function of the representative household should 
include disutility from labour in addition to consumption, and labour should be included in the 
output production function. Due to the fact that the model we use lacks these two 
characteristics, the loss function cannot be derived analytically. We therefore use an ad hoc 
quadratic loss function following the guidelines of Woodford (2003) and Levine et al (2008). 
Following Levine et al (2008), the relative weight of consumption gap in the loss function,  c  , 
when inflation weight is normalized, is given by: 
p
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where   is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in the household utility 
function,  c   is the share of consumption gap in the output gap,  F   is the gross share of fixed 
costs in output,   is the discount factor,  p   is Calvo parameter,   is the CES among 
differentiated labor types,   is the elasticity of substitution among the competitive final goods 
and    is the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas intermediate-goods-sector production 
function. Accordingly, in the core model of Levine et al (2008)  081 . 0  c  , assuming  3 . 0    
and  6 . 0  c  .
10 Assuming that the Calvo parameter corresponds to our model is 0.75,  7   , 
and setting      and  1  F   as our model lacks differentiated labor types and fixed costs 
respectively, and calibrating  32 . 0    we get that  081 . 0  c   in our model too. 
However, for sensitivity analysis we choose to set  } 005 . 0 ], 1 . 0 ,..., 0 {[ by c   .  
The observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates gradually implies that the 
loss function should also include an interest smoothing term. By including an interest rate 







1 ) ( ) ( ) (          t t i t t c t t t i i hc c L     . 
The result of estimation and calibration of a three-term loss function with an interest rate 
smoothing term is a wide range for the relative weight of the interest rate change,  i  . In a 
small-scale NK model for the American economy, Dennis (2004) finds that  i  =12.82 from 
1966:Q1 to 2002:Q2,  i  =2.5 for the Volker-Greenspan period, and  i  =2.78 for the 
Greenspan period. Argov (2005) calibrates  i  =4 for a small NK model for Israel, and Segal 
(2007) finds by calibration that  i   should be higher than one, for a variant of the model we 
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use in this paper. Hence, for sensitivity analysis we choose to set 
} 25 . 0 ], 16 ,..., 0 {[ by i   . 
The difference between the various policy rules in terms of the approximated welfare of the 
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4  Israeli data 2007–08 
In this section we describe the main implications of the recent changes in commodity and oil 
prices on inflation and monetary policy in Israel.  
The high volatility in international commodity and oil prices during the last two years was 
reflected both in the CPI and in core inflation indices in Israel. From January 2007 to July 
2008 the Reuters commodity price index rose by 52.2% and oil prices by 131.1% (Figure 1); 
in the second half of 2008 the Reuters commodity price index fell by 53.1% and the price of 
oil by 69.1% as the global financial crisis intensified and economic activity contracted. 
Figure 1 
The commodity price index and oil prices,  




The high volatility in international prices trickled into the CPI in Israel, which rose by 3.4% in 
2007 and by 4.5% during the 12 months to November 2008 (Table 1). This inflation 
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However, this high price volatility was not fully reflected in core inflation indices,
11 which were 
separated from the CPI in August 2007. Hence, a monetary policy dilemma emerged 
regarding the appropriate inflation index to which to respond (Figure 2). 
 
Table 1 
The CPI and selected core inflation indices in Israel,  
2007 to November 2008 
Percentage change in annual term 
 






CPI  3.4 4.5 4.7 0.9 
Energy 14.4  -2.8  11.5  -27.9 
Food (excluding fruit and vegetables)  6.3  10.4  17.2  0.6 
Fruit and vegetables  7.0  6.9  3.8  2.5 
Housing  1.9 10.3  -2.6 23.4 
CPI excluding energy, food and fruit and 
vegetables  1.6 4.0 1.8 4.5 
CPI excluding energy, food, fruit and 
vegetables and housing  1.5  1.8  3.6  -1.8 
Source: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Figure 2 
CPI and core inflation indices development in Israel,  
2006 to November 2008 




















































































CPI excluding energy, food and fruit and vegetables
CPI excluding energy, food, fruit and vegetables and housing
 
Source: Based on Central Bureau of Statistics. 
                                                  
11  These observable indices, unlike the indices in the model, do not relate to the unobserved imported consumer 
goods inflation,. Also, these indices exclude food and energy prices while the indices in the model exclude fuel 
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The change in world food and oil prices has been reflected only partly in local prices due to 
the appreciation of the ILS throughout most of the period. The nominal effective exchange 
rate
12 showed appreciation of 12.9% from January 2007 to July 2008 (Figure 3), continuing 
the trend that started in 2006; in that period the ILS appreciated by 8.5% against the euro, 
and by 20.1% against the dollar. In March 2008 the Bank of Israel announced a plan to 
increase foreign exchange reserves by $10 billion over the next two years by purchasing 
approximately $25 million per day in the market, starting on 24 March. As a result of 
strengthening of the ILS, the indexation of the housing component
13 to the USD that resulted 
from the high inflation era of 1978-85 (Eckstein and Soffer (2006)) has weakened. Another 
reason for the fact that the change in domestic energy prices does not fully reflect the global 
change is the high tax component in the fuel price.
14 
Whereas the steep rise in local prices until the third quarter of 2008 mainly resulted from 
increases in food and energy prices, in the second half of 2008 the housing index, which 
rose by 9.2% (regular terms), led the rise in the CPI. This rise in the housing index was 
primarily the result of the renewal of rental contracts.
15 
Figure 3 
The ILS/US$, ILS/Euro and the nominal effective exchange rates, 
2007 to December 2008 
 
Source: Bank of Israel. 
In the second half of 2008 the trend of the strengthening ILS against the dollar reversed, and 
the ILS depreciated by 21.8%. This occurred against the background of the worldwide 
strengthening of the dollar and the Bank of Israel announcement on 10 July to increase the 
rate of its purchases of foreign currency in the framework of its plan to increase the forex 
reserves (see above), from $25 million to $100 million per day. 
                                                  
12   The weighted average exchange rate of the shekel against the currencies of Israel’s trading partners. 
13   The housing component accounts for about 21% of the CPI. 
14   Tax accounts for 62% of the price of fuel (ILS5 per litre in December 2008).  
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Israel’s economic growth continued in the third quarter of 2008, albeit at a slower pace than 
in the last four years, when growth had averaged 5.3% a year. This slowdown was expected 
in light of the previous high growth rates and the global slowdown in economic activity. 
Following these developments, policy decisions became more complex, with inflation risks 
countered by considerations of financial stability on the one hand and the support of real 
economic activity on the other. Expectations of inflation for the next 12 months, those derived 
from the capital market and those of private forecasters, were highly volatile during the last 
two years (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 
Expectations of inflation for the next 12 months,  
derived from the capital market and according to private forecasters,  
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  Source: Private forecasters’ reports and Bank of Israel. 
In the first half of 2007 expectations were around the lower limit of the inflation target, due to 
the appreciation trend of the ILS. As a result, Bank of Israel gradually lowered the interest 
rate from 5.5% in October 2006 until it reached a level of 3.5% in June 2007. The 
appreciation trend, which reversed temporarily in the second quarter of 2007, together with 
the steep rise in food and energy prices and rapid domestic growth, brought inflation 
expectations to around the middle of the inflation target and led to increases in the Bank of 
Israel’s interest rate for August and September 2007 and January 2008. 
In March and April 2008 the interest rate was lowered again in light of expectations of an 
economic slowdown, but following the further rises in world and local prices, expectations in 
the second and third quarters climbed to the upper limit of the inflation target, and the interest 
rate was raised again in order to maintain credibility. In the end of the third quarter of 2008, in 
light of the deterioration in the global financial market and the economic slowdown, inflation 
expectations fell sharply to below the lower limit of the target. Hence, similarly to other 
central banks throughout the world, in the fourth quarter of 2008 the interest rate was cut 
sharply, twice in unscheduled decisions, and again for January 2009, to reach an 
unprecedented low level of 1.75%. 
  Expectations derived from the capital market 
  Average of private forecasts 
  Range of private forecasts 
  Inflation target limits BIS Papers No 49  219
 
 
The question of whether monetary policy reacted too aggressively during 2008 arises 
because core inflation increased by less than 2% until August 2008, while headline inflation 
was significantly above the upper limit of the inflation target from December 2007. We 
analyse this question empirically in the next section. 
5  Core inflation or headline inflation?  
A 1% shock to the world price of imported goods raises inflation, and raises the real 
exchange rate as foreign prices denominated in local currency are higher than local prices. 
As a result, the different measures of inflation increase in the following order, HI>CI>CIH, 
and hence the policy rule implies that the interest rate should be raised. Figure 5 summarises 
the impulse response of the endogenous variables determined by the model as a result of 
import price shock.
16  
As the nominal interest rate increases, and due to nominal frictions in prices, the real interest 
rate also increases. Figure 5 indicates that the real interest rate path under policy rule that 
responds to core inflation, either CI or CIH, is higher than under headline inflation rule. 
Hence, the output gap and consumption gap are lower under core inflation rules (See 
Appendix B). As a result of the rise in the interest rates, both nominal and real exchange rate 
decrease and converge back to steady state. 
By assumption, investments and government spending are exogenous, hence the change in 
the output gap can be decomposed into two components: domestic consumption and 
exports. Affected by the real depreciation, domestic consumption declines (dominant effect), 
whereas exports rise. 
                                                  




Impulse response function relating to a 1% shock  




As a result of the shock, CI is higher than CIH due to the indexation of the housing 
component to the current and lagged nominal ILS/US$ exchange rates. Due to the fact that 
the interest rate rises in response to the shock, according to the UIP condition, the expected 
nominal exchange rate reflects appreciation. Thus, CIH is lower than CI and the implication is 
a more moderate interest rate response for the CIH. The reason for the higher rise in the 
interest rate under CIR than under HIR is the negative headline inflation gap (CPI- ) from 
the third quarter, whereas the CI gap is positive until the seventh quarter. The higher decline 
in the expected output gap under CIR also contributes to the further increase in the interest 
rate. 
Table 2 summarises the variances of the key variables among the alternative policy rules. 
The headline (CPI) inflation rule gives higher volatility of inflation than do the core inflation 
rules, while the volatilities of the output gap, consumption gap and interest rates are lower. 




Output gap, inflation and interest rate variances  
among alternative policy rules 
 Output  gap  Headline 




HIR  0.00009 0.00316 0.00215 0.00084 0.00007 0.00096 
CIR  0.00021 0.00239 0.00078 0.00009 0.00017 0.02055 
CIHR  0.00009 0.00276 0.00124 0.00028 0.00010 0.00853 
 
The volatility of the consumption gap under CIR is 21 times higher than HIR and 9 times 
higher than CIHR. Furthermore, the volatility of the consumption gap under the CIR is higher 
than all other volatilities by more than the ratio of the corresponding relative weights in the 
loss function. The result is that the CIR is "out of the game," as shown below. The fact that 
interest rate volatility is lower under the CIH Taylor rule than under the CI Taylor rule is 
explained by the lower inflation––as the interest rate rises, the resulting nominal appreciation 
leads to a decline in the housing component of the CPI.  
In what follows we describe the welfare implications of the different Taylor rules using the 
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where 
CIH   enters the loss function because the CPI housing prices are sticky, by 
assumption, as housing prices develop as a function of both current and lagged nominal 
rates of ILS/US$ depreciation. 
Using Argov and Elkayam (2007) estimates, we set the degree of price indexation,  42 . 0   , 
and the level of external habit formation,  542 . 0  h . We found, as it is expected and 
described in Table 2, that the ratio of the loss function under the domestic inflation Taylor 
rule (CIR), to the loss function under the CPI Taylor rule (HIR) is above unity when the 
relative weight of the quasi-change in consumption is  014 . 0  c  . This implies that HIR is 




Welfare loss ratio of CI Taylor rule to headline inflation Taylor rule 
 
Next, we calculated the ratio of the loss function under CIHR to that under HIR (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 
Welfare loss ratio - CIH Taylor rule over headline inflation Taylor rule 
 
On the other hand, Figure 7 implies that for most of the plausible range of the loss function 
parameter values, monetary policy should respond to core inflation including housing, CIH, 
rather than to headline inflation. The advantage of CIHR (Figure 7) derives from the lower 
core inflation than that measured by HIR and the lower ratio between the volatilities of the 
consumption gap under the two policy rules, compared to the CIR and HIR consumption-gap 
ratio. This result is enhanced with the decrease in the weights of the consumption gap, but it 
is not monotonic with respect to the weights of the interest rate; for low weights of the 
consumption gap, the loss function ratio increases with the increase in the weights of the 
interest rate, while for high weights of the consumption gap it decreases. BIS Papers No 49  223
 
 
Figure 8 summarises the results of Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
Figure 8 
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Should monetary policy respond to headline inflation or core inflation? Most central banks’ 
primary mandate is to achieve overall CPI price stability. However, as an external price 
shock leads to a trade-off between inflation and the output gap, most central banks monitor 
core inflation as part of the policy decision-making process, as it reduces transitory noise and 
could prevent the central bank from responding too strongly to transitory shocks. For 
example, the January 2009 minutes of the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) 
contain projections of PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) inflation as well as Core 
PCE, which is the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Similarly, The Bank of 
Israel minutes of discussions on the interest rate for February 2008-January 2009 contain 
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We answer this question using a small open economy New Keynesian model and a simple 
loss function adapted to the Israeli economy. We find that a Taylor rule that responds to core 
inflation that includes the CPI housing component is preferred. Analysing an impulse 
response function relating to a shock to imported consumer prices, we find that the output 
gap loss is lower when policy responds to headline inflation rather than to core inflation. 
However, as welfare is affected not only by output gap volatility but also by inflation volatility 
and interest rate changes, using an ad hoc quadratic loss function we find that the monetary 
policy should respond to core inflation in order to maximise the welfare of the household, 
despite the higher loss in terms of the output gap and consumption gap. 
However, the conclusion that monetary policy should respond to core inflation cannot be 
viewed as a general result, as the welfare loss function depends on the particular structure of 
the model, and by definition, contains price components that are not flexible. Moreover, the 
analysis above ignores credibility considerations. When headline inflation diverges from core 
inflation for a long period, a central bank that responds to core inflation may find it hard to 




The stages of development of the model  
(Argov and Elkayam (2007)) 
I. Households 
The representative household j consumes a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle of domestic and imported 
goods, 
h
t C  and 
f
t C  respectively. The households’ utility is characterised by external habit 
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j C u , 
where  ) 1 , 0 (  h  represents the strength of habit formation and 
1    is the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution. Household j chooses consumption, domestic bond holdings,  t j B ) ( , 
and foreign bond holdings, 
f
t j B ) ( , which maximises its expected utility subject to the budget 
constraint: 
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where  t   is a risk premium paid on foreign assets,  t   is the nominal exchange rate,  ) ( j X is 
the household share of aggregate real profits in the domestic economy,  t i  and 
*
t i  are 
domestic and foreign risk-free rates, respectively, and   is the subjective quarterly discount 
rate.  
Log-linearisation of the first-order conditions of the household problem yields the inter-
temporal consumption condition (Euler equation):
17  

























the UIP condition: 
(4)  t t t t t t i i e E e      
*
1 , 
and the demand for domestically produced goods bundles: 






t p p c c     , 
where   is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution. The aggregate price level, excluding 
housing, fuel, and fruit and vegetables prices, which is a CES function of domestic goods, 
h
t p , and imported goods, 
f
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c w  is the long-run share of imports in consumption. Assuming the same intra-
temporal elasticity of substitution   abroad, the demand for the local economy’s exports is 






t p e p y x      , 
where 
*
t y  is world trade and 
*
t p  is the price of consumer goods in the foreign economy. 
Assuming the law of one price, and that prices in the export sector are flexible,  t
h
t e p   is the 
export price in foreign currency. Finally, the real exchange rate is defined as 
(8) 
h
t t t t p e p q   
* . 
Log-linearisation of the national account identity yields: 
(9) 
h






t c t inv x g c y ) 1 (              , 
where  t y  is the output gap, 
h
t g  and 
h
t inv  are government consumption and investment, in 
value added terms, and  i   is the long-run share in output of component i. 
Using (3)–(9) the output gap equation is given by: 
(10) 
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t p p 1     . 
According to equation (10), the output gap is determined by the real interest rate, the real 
exchange rate, government spending, investments and world trade. 
II.  Domestic producers inflation equation 
Following Rotemberg’s (1982) price-setting, firms choose a price sequence to minimise the 
cost of price changes due to a menu cost shock and the cost of deviating from the flexible 
price: 
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where 
h
t i p ) ( ~  is the optimal flexible price that would have been chosen by the firms in the 
absence of adjustment costs, and   is a discount factor. 
The first order condition for the firm’s optimisation problem is 
(12)  ) ) ( ) ( ~ (
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where 
h
t i p ) ( ~  is solved from the profit maximisation under flexible prices: BIS Papers No 49  227
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subject to the aggregate output identity, and the production function 
(14) 
      







t t t i Z i Z i Z i Y , 
where 
h
t i Z ) (  and 
f
t i Z ) (  are intermediate domestic and imported inputs respectively, 
z
t P  is 
the aggregate price of intermediate inputs and 
z
f w  is the share of imports in intermediate 
goods. The price and quantity of government spending and investments are, by assumption, 
exogenous. 
The local demand function (5), demand for export (7), the production function (14) and 
F.O.C. of the flexible price optimisation problem yield the optimal flexible price 
(15)  t
t h







The RHS of the optimal flexible price is the log deviation of nominal marginal cost, where the 
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where 
zh
t p  and 
zf
t p  are the prices of domestic and imported inputs to production. The local 




t p p  . 
From this assumption and the first-order condition for the firm’s optimisation problem, the 
optimal flexible price and the input price aggregator, the inflation of domestically produced 
consumer goods is given by 
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Assuming that only a fraction   of the firms set their price accordingly, while a fraction 
) 1 (    adjust their price to last period’s domestic inflation (and set  1   ), domestically 
produced consumer goods inflation is given by: 
(18)  ) (
1
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The assumption of an immediate pass-through from the exchange rate and world prices to 








t p  can be written as the sum of two components:
18 the temporary deviation (from trend) 













                                                  
18   See Argov and Elkayam (2007), Appendix A.  228  BIS Papers No 49
 
 
Plugging this decomposition, the Phillips curve for domestically produced consumer goods, 
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      . 
III.  The nominal exchange rate equation 
According to the UIP condition (4), the spot nominal exchange rate is affected by future rate 
expectations, 
exp
1  t e , and the interest rate differential: 
(20)  t t t t t i i e e      
* exp
1 . 
By assuming that households’ expectations with respect to the exchange rate are partly 
rational and partly adaptive, 
(21)  1
exp exp
1 ) 1 (      e t t t e E e e   , 
the equation for the exchange rate is given by 
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IV.  The monetary policy rule 
The central bank sets its interest rate according to an expanded forward-looking Taylor rule: 
(23)  1 ] ) ( )[ 1 (          t i t y
R
t t t t i t i k y k E k r k i      , 
where 
R
t     is the year-on-year inflation rate at    t ,    is the inflation target,  t r  is the 
forward yield to maturity on indexed-linked Treasury bonds, a proxy to the natural rate, and 
the inflation forecast horizon is   quarters. 
V.  CPI component equations 
The model is closed with three ad hoc equations for housing, fuel, and fruit and vegetable 
prices in the CPI. The CPI housing component equation is a function of the nominal rate of 
depreciation of the ILS against the dollar,  t de , and the inflation target,  t  : 
(24)  ) )( 1 ( ) ( 1            t t
housing
t de de . 
The CPI fuel component equation is given by 









t       is the price change of a barrel of crude oil, and 
brent
t   is a random 
shock.  
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Finally, imported consumer goods inflation in local currency, assuming an immediate pass-









Deriving the consumption gap from the Euler equation 
Starting from the Euler equation 
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Appendix C:  
Estimated and calibrated parameters  
(Argov and Elkayam (2007)) 
f w         h     
0.39   0.379 0.336 0.542 0.99
i k      g    x    c   
0.8   0.58   0.225 0.156 0.48
k   1 f     
 k   y k  
0.0254 0.75   0.75   2.0   0.5  
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